A Case Study in Epistemic Domination: Han Narrative Shaping in the People’s Republic of China
May 2023
Throughout the world and throughout history, dominant social groups have and continue to use their power to define, represent, and control the narratives of other marginalized classes of people. In an important sense, such behavior is both tautological and inevitable: For a group to truly be ‘dominant,’ seems, in many ways, to require at least a plurality of control over the milieu of any given social context. If a group did not control a plurality share of the social narrative it would seem difficult to make the case that that group is truly socially dominant. Moreover, groups that have such a power will inevitably use it, not necessarily out of mal-intent, but because truly dominant groups, by virtue of their dominance, cannot help but influence and shape the paradigms of their respective milieus and are in many ways responsible for the general zeitgeist, including the public perceptions of minority groups therein.1 Indeed, I find myself unable to think of an example of a dominant group that does not dominate its respective infosphere.
None of this is to say that social dominance of this type is above critique, nor that there aren’t more and less just implementations of it. Like many things, the dominant group’s plurality control of the narrative strikes me as a necessary– or at least inevitable –evil. Highlighting and analyzing this phenomenon in its various and specific forms may curb its most pernicious manifestations. As noted earlier, dominance of this type is a trans-geographic and trans-temporal phenomenon. Some examples are highly salient: Gender relations in Afghanistan; Class relations in the KSA; Caste relations in India; Tribal relations in Tanzania; Sectarian relations in Iran; Ideological relations in Russia; Race relations in Brazil, etc. Other examples have not yet penetrated the discourse to the same degree, such as ‘neurotypical society’s’ often paternalistic and ignorant attitude towards the neurodivergent ‘community,’ but are present and important nonetheless.
Among the plethora of potential examples, I will focus on the situation in the PRC and examine how the socially-dominant ethnic group there, the Han, ‘use their power to define, represent, and control’ the narratives about minority ethnic and ethno-religious groups in the PRC such as the Uyghurs and Tibetans, among others. I have chosen this as my case study for three primary reasons: 1. With almost 20% of the world’s population and immense global influence, better understanding the PRC strikes me as self-evidently important;2 2. I think the situation in the PRC is particularly nuanced and thus invites thoughtful analysis; and 3. Given a career possibly oriented, at least in part, towards the national security space, I believe further rumination on this topic is, for me personally, a particularly useful heuristic exercise.
Specifically, I will argue that the Han political-establishment: 1. Explicitly shapes knowledge production and dissemination via a vast digital censorship apparatus; 2. Intentionally disorients domestic ethnic groups such as the Uyghurs by forcibly extending to them what might be called ‘Han ignorance’3 so as to cloud their perception of self; 3. Subtly engages in a practice of ‘otherizing’ domestic ethnic minorities in a manner ironically akin to historic Orientalism.
To begin, perhaps the most obvious and least interesting means by which the Han-led CCP dominates the infosphere and sets the ‘parameters of thought’ by which both Han and non-Han PRC nationals view domestic minorities is through digital censorship, particularly via the removal of any content that is deemed critical of the regime or anticipated to foster civil society.4 The social and epistemic ramifications of this program are, by design, immense and multifaceted. For one, by literally dictating which terms are and are not permissible within the discourse, the Han-oriented system inherently prevents minorities from defining themselves in their own terms. For instance, phrases as central to Tibetan culture such as “Dalai Lama” are excised from the online discourse.5
More subtly, however, the censorship regime prevents ethnic minorities from defining themselves by explicitly restricting their ability to express what Princeton’s Jason Stanley calls ‘not-at-issue content.’6 ‘Not-at-issue’ content, for Stanley, are the assumptions baked into statements that lay the foundation for our epistemic common ground. For instance, the statement (which would quickly be scrubbed from the PRC internet) that “Nancy Pelosi was eager to visit the Republic of China” (Taiwan) proposes a live contribution to the common ground: That Nancy Pelosi visited the island formerly known as Formosa. However, this statement also asserts and assumes a subtle not-at-issue claim, which is that there indeed exists a Republic of China in the first place (a claim authorities in Beijing stridently deny). As Stanley argues, these not-at-issue claims are “directly added to the common ground.”7 By controlling the possible ‘not-at-issue’ phrases that are permissible within the discourse, the regime authorities can determine how issues are framed and essentially monopolize the so-called common ground. In other words, the censorship apparatus negates the concept of a true ‘common-ground’ altogether and essentially forces everybody in the PRC to stand on the CCP’s ground.
Likewise, the censorship apparatus determines which slurs are and are not permissible within the discourse. Although, in colloquial language, slurs have a negative connotation and should be avoided in-and-of themselves, they, as defined by Camp (referenced in Stanley), are normatively neutral:
Although it is undeniable, and important, that slurs denigrate, I think an associated feeling of contempt is less important and explanatory than is usually assumed. Rather, I think the association with contempt largely falls out of a more basic one: that the perspective is distancing in the sense that the speaker signals that he is not “of” or aligned with [the slur target]; and more specifically, that it is derogating in the sense that the speaker signals that [the targets of the slur] are not worthy of respect.8
Under this definition, it seems quite possible to envision ‘slurs’ that reasonable people would endorse in certain contexts. For instance, when describing Joseph Stalin as a “tyrant,” the word “tyrant” is functioning as a slur under Camp’s definition. That label is not only denigrating (Stalin himself would likely take issue with this term), but it also inherently distances the speaker from Stalin– the debate across the political spectrum is almost always about who the tyrant is, not whether tyrants are good, and thus few want to be associated with ‘tyrants’ as the term is inherently pejorative and is associated with those undeserving of respect. This is relevant because the internet censorship in the PRC effectively denies minority populations the use of ‘slurs’ (e.g. calling Xi ‘Winnie the Pooh;’ referring to those who tow the party line as ‘Shitizens,’ etc.) against the elite. Importantly, by preventing ‘subversive slurs’ of this type, the regime fosters an epistemic environment in which people are unable to signal disassociation with the regime. Thus, any and all online discourse within the PRC will occur in a real epistemic bubble (and an illusory echo chamber) that, at least implicitly, frames the regime– and the systems of oppression baked into it –as beloved institutions deserving of respect. Not only does this subjugate obvious minorities such as the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong but it also has the potential to create ‘artificial minorities’ so that plurality or even majority viewpoints that are pejorative (perhaps, for example, that the regime is corrupt) are believed to be held only by a recalcitrant minority rather than a silenced majority.
Secondly, the regime shapes the production of knowledge by clouding the manner by which minorities can ‘know themselves.’ The framework of ‘white ignorance’ as outlined by Mills can usefully be employed to understand ethnic relations in the PRC via a paradigm that we might call ‘Han ignorance.’ According to Mills, ‘white ignorance’ is a pernicious and socially-constructed form of ignorance that is:
An ignorance militant, aggressive, not to be intimidated, an ignorance that is active, dynamic, that refuses to go quietly—not at all confined to the illiterate and uneducated but propagated at the highest levels of the land, indeed presenting itself unblushingly as knowledge.9
In other words, ‘white ignorance’ is a self-preserving ignorance (both lack of knowledge and incorrect knowledge) that supports institutions of white supremacy. ‘Han-ignorance,’ as applied with reference to the PRC, is effectively the same thing but with different racial groups: A system of willful or at least egregiously negligent ignorance in support of a milieu in which the “non-[Han] Other is grasped through a historic array of concepts whose common denominator is their subjects’ location on a lower ontological and moral rung.”10 For instance, Beijing justifies its colonization of Tibet by perpetuating the myth that only through ‘Chinese’ control and values-transfer was slavery outlawed in Tibet, even going so far as to claim that the current Dalai Lama was a slave owner until his forced exile.11
Such ignorance and disinformation of course colors Han perceptions of minorities to justify the relative social inequality that the Han enjoy, but the ignorance also is forced upon the subjugated populations themselves. As Mills notes in White Ignorance:
The “white” in “white ignorance” does not mean that it has to be confined to white people. … [White ignorance] will often be shared by nonwhites to a greater or lesser extent because of the power relations and patterns of ideological hegemony involved. (This is a familiar point from the Marxist and feminist traditions—working-class conservatives, “male-identified” women, endorsing right-wing and sexist ideologies against their interests.) Providing the causal route is appropriate, blacks can manifest white ignorance also.
Likewise, the ‘patterns of ideological hegemony’ within the PRC enable the regime to project ‘Han-ignorance’ onto other minorities. For example, the so-called ‘reeducation’ of the Uyghurs, including the banning of the Uyghur language in all schools, seeks to impose upon the Uyghurs a worldview that perpetuates ‘Han-ignorance;’ even forcing the Uyghur population to conceptualize themselves and their social situation via Mandarin rather than the Uyghur language.12
Additionally, the practice of forcibly ‘Sinicizing’ the Uyghurs by forcing them to live with the families of Han civil servants fundamentally perpetuates the notion that the Uyghurs “are a subject race, dominated by a race that knows them and what is good for them better than they could possibly know themselves.”13 This paternalist ethos is exemplified in one PRC official’s defense of the erasure of the Uyghur language, stating that: Han “education authorities decided to ban the use of the Uyghur language in order to create a favorable environment for minorities to study the national language."14 As Spivak writes, “the subaltern cannot speak, so imbued must she be with the words, phrases and cadences of western thought in order for her to be heard.”15 Swap ‘Western thought’ for ‘Xi Jinping thought’ and Spivak’s analysis becomes keenly relevant.
Moreover, the situation in the PRC invites parallels to civil rights discourse in the United States. For instance, take “early twentieth-century black activist James Weldon Johnson’s remark [that]: ‘colored people of this country know and understand the white people better than the white people know and understand them.’”16 Likewise, this seems to be the predicament the Uyghurs find themselves in. Forced to cohabitate with Han civil servants that have been imported into the region, the Uyghurs are subject to a decidedly unidirectional cultural exchange.
Finally, the PRC essentially ‘Orientalizes’ ethnic minorities in the PRC in much the same way that Asians in general have historically been Orientalized by the West. This is deeply ironic, if unsurprising– totalitarianism has an affinity for contradiction. Central to the phenomenon of Orientalizing is fetishizing the exotic ‘otherness’ of the target population. For instance, Said highlights as a paragon of the Orientalist mindset a 1972 American journal article which “purports to uncover ‘the inner workings of Arab behavior,’ which from our point of view is ‘aberrant’ but for Arabs is ‘normal.’”17
One prime example of this phenomenon occurring in the PRC occurs during the quinquennial meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. There, the party likes to tout its commitment to tolerance and diversity by arranging it such that a token handful of very salient delegates are ethnic minorities. However, the manner in which this charade is organized and choreographed is quite revealing. The vast majority of the delegates are Han men clad in black suits. The minority delegates, however, are mostly female and, moreover, dressed in the most conspicuous ethnic garb imaginable. The message from Beijing, as exhibited below in Fig. 1, is clear: These people exist in the PRC and they will be tolerated (for now?), but they are not ‘us;’ they are quaint exotic objects of curiosity; an endangered species which we should sentimentally appreciate with preemptive nostalgia while we still can. In short, they are, to quote Said, not ‘normal’ but rather ‘aberrant.’ Furthermore, these minority delegates are often ‘invited’ (required) to perform various ethnic dances for the Congress, further indicating that their ‘representation’ is performative rather than substantive.
Of course, I am not actually suggesting that this phenomenon is ‘Orientalism.’ It is clearly something distinct and different from the historical and cultural implications of Orientalism as understood by Said. But I am saying that the CCP is employing a markedly similar mindset in their treatment and subjugation of ethnic minorities within the PRC.
Fig. 1:18 Scenes from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 2022
These scenes call to mind Jo Sharp’s retelling of African-American writer Bell Hooks’ experience of ‘otherization’ in the United States. Sharp writes:
However, Hooks has felt silenced by Western academics who seek the experience, but not the wisdom, of the other. She argues that ‘I was made “other” there in that space ... they did not meet me there in that space. They met me at the center’ (hooks, 1990: 342). The experiences of the marginalized are used in postcolonial theories, but without opening up the process to their knowledges, theories and explanations. When there is a meeting, it is in the centre – in the (predominantly) Western institutions of power/knowledge (aid agencies, universities, the pages of journals) and in the languages of the west (science, philosophy, social science and so on, expressed in English, French, Spanish ...). So, by approaching the institutions of knowledge, Hooks has been forced to the centre; a location both metaphorical in its control of authority and geographical in its physical presence.19
Likewise, the Party here seems to be making perfectly clear that they want to experience the ‘Other,’ but only on their terms. No ethnic delegates have anything approximating a substantive, meaningful role or even a platform to voice their own views. Additionally, to modify Sharp’s quote, this public meeting takes place ‘in the center’– in the (predominantly) Han institutions of power/knowledge (CCP, Party Congresses, Cadres, Great Hall of the People, Beijing) and in the languages of the regime (Xi Jinping Thought, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, dialectical materialism and so on, expressed in Mandarin …).
In conclusion, this paper has only begun to scratch the surface of the means by which the systemically-Han CCP ‘uses their power to define, represent, and control the narratives’ of minority groups within the CCP, effectively shaping ‘the production of knowledge, the perpetuation of stereotypes, and the maintenance of systems of oppression’ endemic to totalitarian societies. Nonetheless, the authors we have read this semester, even when focusing on the very real and present issues in the West, articulate lessons that are enduring in other contexts. Although cultures and political situations differ markedly throughout time and space, social hierarchies are universal and thus any epistemic arrangement will, at least in part, be non-ideally predicated on the proclivities and paradigms of the dominant group. As the PRC poses an ever greater and ever more draconian strategic challenge to the liberal world, understanding the tools and techniques that the regime employs for self-preservation is increasingly important, and I am grateful for this course and for these readings for (among many other things) helping me better understand the epistemic situation within the PRC.
Bibliography
"Dalai Lama's utter distortion of Tibet history." Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Manchester. Last modified March 3, 2009. http://manchester.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/200903/t20090312_3435683.htm.
Hartman, Leigh. "In China, you can't say these words." Share America. Last modified June 3, 2020. https://share.america.gov/in-china-you-cant-say-these-words/.
Kang, Dake, and Yanan Wang. "China's Uighurs told to share beds, meals with party members." AP News. Last modified November 30, 2018. https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-prayer-weddings-occasions-9ca1c29fc9554c1697a8729bba4dd93b.
Mills, Charles W. Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017.
O'Neil, Patrick H., and Ronald Rogowski, comps. Essential Readings in Comparative Politics. 5th ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018.
Radio Free Asia. "China Moves to Ban Use of Uyghur Language in Schools." Edited by Hai Do. Voice of America. Last modified August 2, 2017. https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/china-moves-to-ban-uyghur-language-in-schools/3969575.html.
Said, Edward. "Knowing the Oriental." In Orientalism, 31-49. New York, NY: Vintage, 1979.
Sharp, Joanne. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In Geographies of Postcolonialism, 109-17. London: Sage Publications, 2008.
Stanley, Jason. "Language as a Mechanism of Control." In How Propaganda Works, 7-14. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015.
Mills nods towards this conclusion as well, noting: “For if the society is one structured by relations of domination and subordination (as of course all societies in human history past the hunting-and-gathering stage have been), then in certain areas this conceptual apparatus is likely going to be negatively shaped and inflected in various ways by the biases of the ruling group(s);” Charles W. Mills, Black Rights/white Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 60.
Although this is not to say, of course, that these types of issues do not manifest in the West.
I will explain this in more depth later, but in short I envision ‘Han-ignorance’ as analogous to Mills’ conception of ‘white ignorance:’ A socially-constructed and institutionally-perpetuated ignorance about minority populations, their cultures, histories, and perspectives, and the institutional challenges they face, tailored so as to maintain Han-supremacy within the PRC. There are many examples– One might be the narrative touted by Beijing, to Han and Uyghur alike, that Uyghur society is blessed to be governed by Beijing because under their own rule they would devolve into a primitive and violent culture, or, alternatively, that Gyaincain Norbu was chosen to be the Panchen Lama through legitimate and traditional means.
Patrick H. O'Neil and Ronald Rogowski, comps., Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, 5th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), 290.
Leigh Hartman, "In China, you can't say these words," Share America, last modified June 3, 2020, https://share.america.gov/in-china-you-cant-say-these-words/.
Jason Stanley, "Language as a Mechanism of Control," in How Propaganda Works (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 7.
Ibid.
Id. 8
Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs, 49.
Id. 62
"Dalai Lama's utter distortion of Tibet history," Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Manchester, last modified March 3, 2009, http://manchester.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/200903/t20090312_3435683.htm.
Although beyond the scope of this paper, Orwell’s Politics and the English Language sheds a lot of light on why this is particularly problematic– Namely curtailing the language curtails one’s ability to ideate.
Edward Said, "Knowing the Oriental," in Orientalism (New York, NY: Vintage, 1979), 35.; Dake Kang and Yanan Wang, "China's Uighurs told to share beds, meals with party members," AP News, last modified November 30, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-prayer-weddings-occasions-9ca1c29fc9554c1697a8729bba4dd93b.
Radio Free Asia, "China Moves to Ban Use of Uyghur Language in Schools," ed. Hai Do, Voice of America, last modified August 2, 2017, https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/china-moves-to-ban-uyghur-language-in-schools/3969575.html.
Joanne Sharp, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in Geographies of Postcolonialism (London: Sage Publications, 2008), 111.
Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs, 53.
Said, "Knowing the Oriental," 48.
None of the images are mine.
Sharp, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," 112.