His Majesty’s Federation? Questioning the Royalist Hypothesis
April 2022 (revised December 2023)
Understanding both the intended and proper roles of the American executive (which are not necessarily the same) is increasingly pertinent as Americans across the political spectrum worry about the alleged authoritarian (or at least draconian) impulses of our presidential candidates and of our national zeitgeist more generally. Discussion of this balance was saliently reignited during the George W. Bush Administration in light of legal theories which gained purchase within the White House purporting the Unitary Executive Theory of presidential power. More recently, many fear candidate Trump’s attitude towards executive power should he win reelection in 2024, concerns elevated most starkly following his comment to Sean Hannity in December 2023 claiming that if he returned to the White House, he wouldn’t be a dictator “except for day one.”1 This essay will explore and critique a recent argument by scholar Eric Nelson suggesting that the framers intended for the President to have far more power than we generally imagine.
In the American civic imagination, the American Revolution is framed as a struggle both against the general notions of monarchy and authoritarianism as well as the specific person and behaviors of King George III. In his book The Royalist Revolution, Monarchy and the American Founding, Eric Nelson seeks to correct this account and present the American Revolution, and the subsequent constitutional project, as a rejection of overbearing legislative power in support of a stronger and more active executive. As Nelson argues, many American colonists, frustrated with the heavy-handed actions of the ostensible ‘corrupt multitude’ within the British parliament, became convinced that Parliament had usurped the powers of the British monarchy, and, with this perceived injustice in mind, initially appealed to George III to assert personal control over the American colonies.2 Nelson acknowledges that this ‘royalist revolution’ was only a subcomponent of the wider revolutionary movement, and that these royalist attitudes were certainly not universal, noting that the rhetoric of anti-royalists like Thomas Paine forever turned the American public against the nominal monarch. However, Nelson asserts that, despite these dissents, the undercurrent of royalist sentiment “achieved intellectual dominance” during the constitutional convention and resulted in an American executive with profoundly royal-esque authorities, including the powers to nominate, veto, pardon, and command the armed forces.3 In short, Nelson argues that royalist sentiment not only survived the political sea change of the revolution but thrived in its aftermath, and resulted in the framers, after some compromise, establishing for themselves a king in all but name, writing that “once the title of King had been abolished, … Americans were eventually able to make their peace with kingly power.”4
George III in Coronation Robes, Allan Ramsay, 1761-1762.
Nelson’s thesis is resonant, well-researched, and offers a formidable and enduring challenge to the simplistic but prolific paradigm which paints George III and his office as the primary antagonist of the early American enterprise. However, Nelson overlooks one key point in his analysis, a point which, in many important respects, undercuts the entire notion of a ‘royalist revolution.’ That point is the all-important matter of federalism and the explicitly limited powers of the federal government in relation to the American states.
House of Commons in Session, Peter Tillemans, 1709-1714.
Federalism is so integral to our constitutional system that it is impossible to understand the role of the American executive without it, especially before the expansion of federal power following the American Civil War. Yet, Nelson mentions federalism only to dismiss it. He briefly touches upon it in his discussion of James Madison, who he acknowledges was more concerned with the federal-state interplay than with the specific nature of the federal executive.5 But Nelson dismisses both Madison and federalism in the next breath, writing that “Madison’s influence in the convention, and the degree to which he shaped the Constitution itself, have been exaggerated,” and that Madison not only “frequently found himself on the losing side of major debates,” but that “he and his fellow delegates disagreed sharply about what the major debates were.”6
President Ronald Reagan's Inauguration at the U.S. Capitol, Architect of the Capitol, 1981.
Despite Nelson’s dismissal of the topic, I believe the issue of federalism is wholly non-trivial to the question of a ‘royalist revolution.’ The question which Nelson focuses on is the question of how much power the executive has in relation to the government in which he is situated, and Nelson makes a compelling case that the framers intentionally provided the U.S. President with royal-esque authorities in relation to the federal government. But an equally important question, and one which Nelson neglects, is the issue of how much authority the government in question, and any executive therein, actually has over the people. Although the new constitution immediately created a government far more powerful than the previous Continental Congress, the overall authorities of the new government were weak not only by the standards of today but also in comparison to the unitary governments of monarchs like George III. Nowadays, the federal government is sprawling and permeates many aspects of our lives, but it is important to remember just how limited this government was at its inception: There was no federal Department of Justice, no federal prison system, no federal income tax regime, virtually no notion of federal regulatory agencies, no federal entitlement programs, extremely limited federally-managed infrastructure development, and the Bill of Rights, unenforceable against the states, served only to further limit the powers and scope of the federal government. Instead, the states, and their own executives (who do not answer to the U.S. President) were responsible for overseeing most critical state functions which traditionally resided in the unitary government of states like Britain. Although our judiciary has codified the supremacy of federal law, this understanding was not clearly established until McCulloch v. Maryland decades after ratification, and still preserved significant state autonomy.
Governor Gretchen Whitmer, Commander-in-Chief of both the Michigan National Guard and the non-federalizable Michigan Defense Force, photo by 2nd Lt. Ashley Goodwin, 2022.
I suspect that traditional monarchs like Charles I, and perhaps even George III, would have found a federal arrangement fundamentally incompatible with the nature of royal authorities and rights. Therefore, if, as Nelson asserts, royalist sentiment really played a paramount role in the constitutional convention, then I find it very odd that committed royalists would have accepted this federal system, as its very structure undermines the notion of ‘kingly power.’ I do find it highly plausible that an appreciation for royal power influenced the Article II authorities vested in the U.S. President in respect to his position within the federal government, but I remain unconvinced of the claim that a large faction of the framers was attempting to create a constitutional arrangement based on the royalist model.
Should we find ourselves in a situation in which we find ourselves questioning the appropriate norms and mores of Presidential authority, it is important to not lean too heavily into narratives that suggest executive power is weaker than the framers’ intended.
Bibliography:
Associated Press. "Trump, Hannity, and the Authoritarian Playbook." AP News. 2023. https://apnews.com/article/trump-hannity-dictator-authoritarian-presidential-election-f27e7e9d7c13fabbe3ae7dd7f1235c72.
Nelson, Eric. The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2014.
Associated Press. "Trump, Hannity, and the Authoritarian Playbook." AP News. 2023. https://apnews.com/article/trump-hannity-dictator-authoritarian-presidential-election-f27e7e9d7c13fabbe3ae7dd7f1235c72.
Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2014), 1-3.
Nelson, Royalist Revolution, 9, 130, 145.
Nelson, Royalist Revolution, 145.
Nelson, Royalist Revolution, 199-200.
Nelson, Royalist Revolution, 202.